

Randomized Algorithms

Exercise Sheet 7

Due: December 8, 2014

Exercise 1: (10 points)

Consider an arbitrary function $f : A_n \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$, where $A_n = \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ and \mathbb{N} is the set of natural numbers. We know nothing about f , but we are given a black-box procedure which returns $f(x)$ for any input value $x \in A_n$. The median of f is any $M \in \mathbb{N}$ such that at least half elements $x \in A_n$ satisfy $f(x) \geq M$ and at least half elements $x \in A_n$ satisfy $f(x) \leq M$. Our objective is to compute two elements $a, b \in A_n$ such that $f(a) \geq M$ and $f(b) \leq M$.

- Propose a zero-error algorithm for computing a and b in the case where we know M .
- Propose an algorithm which computes a and b with error probability at most q for the case in which we do not know M .

The expected running times of the two algorithms must be as low as possible. Assume that we are given an efficient procedure for choosing an element of A_n uniformly at random.

Exercise 2: (10 points)

Recall the randomized median algorithm that we presented in class for finding the median of a set S with n elements. We showed that the algorithm runs in $O(n)$ time and it might fail with probability $O(\frac{1}{n^{1/4}})$. What is the number of random bits required by the algorithm? Modify the algorithm so that it uses only $O(\log n)$ random bits and it fails with probability $O(\frac{1}{n})$. Assume that n is a prime.

Hint: Use the idea of two-point sampling.

Exercise 3: (10 points)

Consider a different version of the stable marriage problem in which men and women might be indifferent between certain options. There are two sets M and W with n men and n women, respectively. Each person has a preference list of the members of the opposite sex but there might be ties. For example, a woman w might prefer man m to man m' or she might be indifferent between them. Each preference list is organized in non-increasing order of desirability. Now, there are two different kinds of instabilities that might occur in a marriage.

- Strong Instability: There exists a man m and a woman w such that they both prefer each other to their actual partners. Can we always find a marriage without strong instabilities?

- Weak Instability: There exists a man m and a woman w married with a woman w' and a man m' , respectively, such that one of the following holds:
 - m prefers w to w' and w prefers m to m' or she is indifferent between them, or
 - w prefers m to m' and m prefers w to w' or he is indifferent between them.

Can we always find a marriage without weak instabilities?

Exercise 4: (10 points)

Recall that the Coupon Collector's problem can be viewed as a balls-into-bins problem. In class, we showed that if we throw $n \ln n + cn$ balls into n bins, where c is a constant, then the probability that a specific bin is empty is approximately $\frac{1}{ne^c}$. Show that the probability that some bin is empty is at least $\frac{1}{e^c} - \frac{1}{2e^{2c}}$, for large n .

Hint: By the inclusion-exclusion principle, for any events E_1, E_2, \dots, E_n

$$Pr(E_1 \cup E_2 \cup \dots \cup E_n) \geq \sum_i Pr(E_i) - \sum_{i \neq j} Pr(E_i \cap E_j)$$

Moreover, for large n

$$\left(1 - \frac{c}{n}\right)^n = e^{-c}$$